| September
Surprise |
by Bill Berkowitz
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Sepember,
05, 2003
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Last May, President Bush made his now-famous -- and outrageously false -- statement to a Polish television station: "We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories.... But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we found them." |
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UN INSPECTION REPORT 7/3/03 Blix/El Baradei Briefing and other items re UN Security Council
[BBC NEWS] Full text:
Blix Briefing For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of Unmovic. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The twelfth quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalised ten days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the council up-to-date. Inspection process Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by Unscom in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure. Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries, which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory. Documents and interviews Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. Unmovic has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. The provision of names prompts two reflections. The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed. The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, seven of these during the last week. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities... no evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation. Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area. There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far. I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send. Recent developments On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalised, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope it's a temporary break. Al Samoud missiles To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including four training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines have been destroyed under Unmovic supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme. Two "reconstituted" casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete. The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile. More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will require further study and discussion. There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. After a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January - but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results. Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced. With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from Unmovic requesting clarification of the issue. What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear. Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated immediately, unconditionally and actively - with Unmovic, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). Initiatives three
to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate"
cooperation The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have
provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the
following: It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and Unmovic is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues. Other resolutions Mr President, Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but Unmovic is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created Unmovic but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific. Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs Unmovic to address unresolved disarmament issues and to identify - key remaining disarmament tasks and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. Unmovic will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required. Unscom and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. Unmovic has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities. It is from the list of these clustered issues that Unmovic will identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks". As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready. Unmovic is only required to submit the work programme with the "key remaining disarmament tasks" to the Council. As I understand that several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to. Each cluster in the
working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could
do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against
the successful resolution of issues. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled. Mr. President, let me conclude by telling you that Unmovic is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, eg, for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc. How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes. Story from BBC NEWS: Published: 2003/03/07 17:58:38 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2830505.stm [BBC NEWS] My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions. When I reported last to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the "reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the "investigative phase", which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years. At the outset, let me state one general observation: namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. We have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq Mohamed ElBaradei This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme. Sites visited The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, IAEA experts have taken part in many joint Unmovic-IAEA inspections. Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in Iraq, weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the relevant laboratories. Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2,000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.
Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible - information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation. Upon our insistence,
individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and
without a taped record The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq. I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews, to ensure that they are conducted freely, and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We intend, therefore, to request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other states to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those states.
In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly on the progress made on each of these issues. Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge manufacturing experts. The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets. The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances. Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse-engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalise the project and improve operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during this time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion. Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this issue will continue to be scrutinised and investigated. Magnet production With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of 12 different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity metres and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing. In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the contract has been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts. They have concluded the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges. Cylinder production Iraq has used its relatively low-accuracy flow-forming capability for the production of rocket parts in steel. Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently started to flow-form its own tubes in aluminium as well. Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts' observations of Iraq's industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's industrial assets - including the availability of raw materials - our assessment to date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise needed to produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has low-quality flow-forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of experience and expertise in this field makes it highly unlikely that it is currently able to produce aluminium cylinders consistently to the tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment. Nevertheless, the IAEA will monitor all potentially capable machines and facilities using 24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a regime of unannounced inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the level of centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq. Uranium 'false reports' The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of states that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001. There is no indication
that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990 For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also
able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government
of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of
that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.
We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials. Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of states. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in contravention of sanction controls specified under Security Council resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions. The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. An IAEA team of technical experts, customs investigators and computer forensic specialists is currently conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at trading companies and commercial organisations, aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.
In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated: There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites. There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990. There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question. Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme. As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinise and investigate all of the above issues. After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to continue to receive from states actionable information relevant to our mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq
will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its co-operation.
However credible this
assessment may be, we will endeavour - in view of the inherent uncertainties
associated with any verification process, and, particularly in light of
Iraq's past record of co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on
a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification
programme, in order to provide the international community with ongoing
and real time assurances.
Hans Blix, chief UN
weapons inspector: Iraq has carried out a substantial measure of disarmament. 'ACTIVE' CO-OPERATION Inspections were not free from friction, but inspectors were able to perform professional no-notice inspections and increase surveillance. Iraq, with a highly-developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its weapons programme. The amount of documents produced was disappointing. It was proving difficult to interview individuals about the weapons programme without a risk of undue pressure on them from the Iraqi authorities. Nevertheless, the interviews were useful. It would be preferable to have better information on sites than double the number of inspectors. Iraq had tried to persuade the inspectors that its al-Samoud missiles had a range within the permissible limit. The inspectors had disagreed, and Iraq had now begun destroying the missiles. But there had been no destruction work on Friday, and hopefully that was a temporary halt to the process. DISARMAMENT TIME Iraq has accepted the order to destroy missiles and has started destruction. The destruction is a "substantial measure of disarmament", the first since the 1990s. "We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks - lethal weapons are being destroyed." More paperwork on anthrax had recently been provided by Iraq. There was a significant effort by Iraq under way to supply information on biological weapons destroyed in 1991. After a period of somewhat reluctant Iraqi co-operation, the level of co-operation had improved. But the important thing was how many questions the inspection process was answering. Some of Iraq's co-operation can be seen as active or even proactive, but these moves have not been immediate and do not cover all areas of relevance. But they are welcome. While Iraqi co-operation should be immediate, disarmament and the verification of it would take some time. It would take months, rather than weeks, or days. Iraq's accelerated co-operation in the past month was welcome, but a "sober judgment" had to be made to assess its value. Mohamed ElBaradei,
IAEA secretary general: Technical support for the nuclear inspections had continued, and interviews had continued with relevant Iraqi personnel. SCIENTIST INTERVIEWS Nuclear inspectors had conducted interviews with individuals and groups, both pre-arranged and during unannounced inspections. At first, Iraqi interviewees had insisted on keeping tapes of their interviews, but recently, they had been agreeing to unescorted and unrecorded interviews. But it would be best to hold such interviews outside Iraq. The IAEA had investigated Iraqi attempts to buy high-quality aluminium tubes. No evidence had been found that the Iraqis had tried to use these for other purposes than the stated one - for engineering rockets. The process was "well documented". The IAEA has concluded that the efforts to buy aluminium tubes were not likely to be related to attempts to manufacture gas centrifuges for enriching uranium. But it will continue investigate the issue. On the subject of magnets - also suspected of use in a nuclear programme - experts had verified that none could be used directly to produce nuclear material. ALUMINIUM TUBES The IAEA had concluded that allegations that Iraq has tried to buy uranium from Niger appeared to be unfounded. Iraqi attempts to procure some materials had breached UN sanctions, and a team of IAEA inspectors was now in Baghdad investigating this. Inspections were moving forward, and had made important progress. At this stage there was no evidence of resumed nuclear activities in buildings reconstructed since 1988, and there was no evidence that Iraq had tried to import uranium since 1990. After three months of intrusive inspections, there was no evidence of a revival of a nuclear programme in Iraq. Story from BBC NEWS: In quotes: reactions
to Blix report Here is a selection of quotes: German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher "Peaceful disarmament is possible and there is a real alternative to war. "We stand united in our condemnation of the Iraqi regime - where we have different views is our strategy how to achieve total disarmament of Iraq. "We see no need for a second resolution." Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara "Iraq has co-operated actively. "[Iraq's destruction of al-Samoud II missiles] is a tangible and material evidence of this co-operation that can neither be considered deceptive nor insignificant." Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez "Mexico is convinced that all roads must be explored... and that every opportunity must be taken advantage of to resolve this matter peacefully." "[Iraq must] rapidly change its attitude." US Secretary of State Colin Powell "I still find what I heard this morning a catalogue of non-co-operation." "The clock continues to tick and the consequences of Saddam Hussein's continued refusal to disarm will be very, very real." "If Iraq wanted to disarm, the co-operation would be voluntary and even enthusiastic, not coerced." "We believe that the resolution that has been put forward for action by the council is appropriate and in the very near future we should bring it before this council for a vote." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov "Now we need not new Security Council resolutions... we need the active support of inspectors in carrying out their tasks." "Russia is firmly in favour of continuing and strengthening the work of inspectors." "The UN must emerge from the Iraq crisis not weakened and divided, but united and strengthened." French Foreign Minister Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin "Significant evidence of real disarmament has been observed." "Why choose division when our unity and resolve are leading Iraq to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction?" "France will not let a resolution pass that authorises the automatic use of force." "No-one ignores the cruelty of this dictatorship and the need to do everything to promote human rights, but that was not the aim of Resolution 1441." Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan "Resolution 1441 has been implemented smoothly on the whole with progress made and results achieved." "As long as we stick to the road of political settlement, the goal of destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could still be achieved." "We are not in favour of a new resolution, particularly one authorising the use of force." "Let them [the inspectors] continue inspections and find out the truth, until they complete the mandate of [UN resolution] 1441." Chilean Foreign Minister Soledad Alvear "We are convinced that this last opportunity for peace passes through strengthening inspections in Iraq with clear deadlines and concrete demands in keeping with the sense of urgency in resolution 1441. "The use of force can only by invoked once all peaceful means to disarm Iraq have been exhausted." Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio "Disarming Iraq is not a question of more inspectors or more time, this, to quote a French thinker, is merely a strategy of impotence." "[Saddam Hussein's] strategy remains the same - to fool us." "We all want peace but we want a peace that is safe and that guarantees... these weapons will not fall in the hands of terrorists who can use them for their own ends." UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw "Nobody, not one minister before this council... has said that Iraq is now fully, actively and immediately in compliance with [UN resolution] 1441." "The progress that has been reported represents only the tip of a huge iceberg of unfinished business." "The only way we are going to achieve the disarmament of a rogue regime... is by backing our diplomacy with a credible threat of force." "We are tabling [an amendment] which will specify a further period beyond the adoption of a resolution for Iraq to take the final opportunity to disarm and to bring themselves into compliance." Pakistani Foreign Minister Munir Akram "If war is to be avoided and a peaceful solution realised, the council must impress upon Iraq... that it must comply fully and faithfully with its resolutions prescribing the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction." "The best assurance of success in ensuring Iraq's disarmament of weapons of mass destruction is the unity of the council." Bulgarian ambassador to the UN Stefan Tavrov "The co-operation of Iraq remains insufficient." "Iraq continues to defy the will of the international community." Cameroon ambassador to the UN Martin Belinga-Eboutou "At this stage, the Council recognises that Iraq has not yet taken the final opportunity offered by the council." "I call on all Council members to work to build together a common position which would make it understood to the Iraqi authorities that they have no alternative - if they wish a peaceful disarmament of their country - but to conform with the decisions of the international community." Iraqi ambassador to the UN Mohammed al-Douri "It seems that the possibility of a war of aggression being launched on Iraq has become imminent, regardless of what the Security Council decides, and regardless of the international position - both official and public - strongly rejecting aggression and war and demanding a peaceful solution." "The French, German, Russian [and] Chinese position clearly expresses the fact that there is no need for a second resolution to be adopted in the Security Council." "It demands that the work of the inspectors continue and that enough time is given them to complete their tasks by peaceful means." "The position of the Arab countries was also clear, particularly the one taken by the last Arab summit, which unanimously expressed the rejection of an attack against Iraq."
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